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I Kalven on the Law of Obscenity "The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity" examines in detail several thenrecent Supreme Court decisions. Time has rendered obsolete most of Kalven's specific arguments, but the way he addressed the decisions remains important. Perhaps the most significant feature of his article is its generosity of spirit. While criticizing each of them, Kalven indicates that every justice made valuable contributions to analyzing the problem of regulating obscenity within the Constitution, although no one solved it. Kalven is clearly sympathetic to the outcome reached by Justices Black and Douglas, though he is mildly skeptical about their doctrinal absolutism. He is attracted to Justice Frankfurter's balancing, but he worries that it is too unstructured. Overall, Kalven presents himself as a somewhat detached observer of the Court's work, yet somehow in dialogue with it. He ends his article with a long paragraph about "the extraordinary difficulty" of the Court's task. 3 The task was difficult because of the "freighted" topic of obscenity, because obscenity law raises core issues about freedom of speech, and because "they perform appreciate that each generation of scholars probably has to discover basic truths for itself.
The observation usually attributed to Mark Twain comes to mind: "When I was a boy of fourteen, my father was so ignorant I could hardly stand to have the old man around. But when I got to be twenty-one, I was astonished at how much the old man had learned in seven years." I take this to express an important truth about the relation between experience and knowledge understood as justified true belief. 4 test without searching for some underlying principle distinguishing low-value from higher-value speech, 10 we might say today that Justice Brennan was arguing at least implicitly that there was no principled way to distinguish between obscene utterances and other "low value" utterances. Put in those terms, Justice Brennan's position is more defensible than Kalven suggested.
Kalven then addressed the two-tier theory directly, which he concluded was an approach that "may have unhappy repercussions on the protection of free speech generally." 11 He thought it "difficult to accept as doctrine" even though "it afforded the Court a statesmanlike way around a dilemma." 12 After a long paragraph setting out the doctrinal structure of the two-tier theory, Kalven said that the correct question about lowvalue speech such as obscenity was, " [W] hat is the social utility of excessively candid and explicit discussions of sex?" 13 The next sentence moved to what Kalven clearly believed was the heart of the problem, the "mixed utterance," in which such "excessive" identified or discussed as such in our case law. … We need not foreclose the future recognition of such additional categories to reject the Government's highly manipulable balancing test as a means of identifying them.").
11 . 12 Id at 10. 13 Id at 12.
candor is "integral" to some "serious view." 14 A solution to that problem would lie in the definition of obscenity, a definition that Justice Brennan's formulation of the issue before the Court avoided. 15 But, Kalven continued, defining obscenity with reference to its worthlessness exposed "a difficulty" with traditional defenses of fee speech. 16 Focusing on how speech contributes to democratic self-governance does not "help much" in explaining why works of imaginative literature and art were covered by the First Amendment: "The people do not need novels or dramas or paintings or poems because they will be called upon to vote. Acknowledging that Justice Brennan's opinion "made several major contributions to the law," Kalven still found the opinion "unsatisfactory" because it endorsed the twotier theory and "appeared to find no difficulties" in addressing the problem. 21 He turned to the other opinions to show how Justice Brennan's opinion was "unpersuasive" and to illuminate the "full complexity of the issue." 22 The "difficulties" that Justice Brennan "so carefully muted exploded" in Justice Douglas's dissent, which rejected the two-tier theory in favor of "a single unified doctrine of free speech" that rejected judicial attention For all practical purposes the law of obscenity has disappeared from view. After a decade and a half of grappling with the problem, the Court adopted a test for identifying obscenity that made "contemporary community standards" determinative. 41 First videotapes, then DVDs, and finally the Web made "hard core" obscenity readily available. Community standards changed to the point where prosecutors found it essentially pointless to pursue obscenity charges against sexually explicit material depicting adults. The law of obscenity remains one of the better vehicles for explicating 40 The pejorative sense comes through in an extended quotation Kalven offered from a brief filed by Thurman Arnold in the Supreme Court, in which Arnold argues, as Kalven put it, that "any fool can quickly recognize hard-core pornography, but it is a fatal trap for judicial decorum and judicial sanity to attempt thereafter to write an opinion explaining why." Kalven at 43 (cited in note ---) (quotation from Arnold at 44). Kalven added a note expressing skepticism that it is so easy to identify hard-core pornography: "One suspects that the touchstone is more likely to be the social status of the publisher than the content of the item." Id at 43 n 129.
41 Miller v California, 413 US 15 (1973) .
the two-tier theory of free speech, but even for purely pedagogical purposes the subject has become problematic. Aside from the difficulty of discussing obscene material in classes where students may be either unfamiliar with the material or familiar with it but embarrassed about saying so, the subject has been complicated by efforts to regulate the different category of pornography. Though those efforts appear to have peaked in the 1990s, they remain interesting conceptually. They provide a vehicle for exploring the possibility of conflicts between constitutional rights or values (free speech and equality) and the idea some speech regulations might be defensible as legislative efforts to increase the dissemination of speech overall.
The "conflict of rights" problem requires us to distinguish between constitutional rights and constitutional values; the "maximizing speech" problem requires us to worry about the relation between quantity (of speech) and distribution (of speakers). Kalven's analysis of obscenity law does not help us in thinking about these newer arguments, at least directly. The "rights/values" problem raises questions about the state action doctrine and whether we have a constitution of merely negative liberties or one of positive rights as well. 42 The "quantity/distribution" problem raises questions about the foundations of democracy as a system of government resting on individual autonomy, 42 Legislative regulation of pornography promotes a constitutional value of equality, but the source of the inequality lies not in the government decisions that are the focus of a state-action oriented account of equality but rather in private decisions. In a constitution of positive rights, the government might be thought to have a duty to address the latter source of inequality. Karst then generalized. The question for balancers will take a common form.
"How much will this regulation advance the chosen governmental objective?," taking into account the possibility of "partial success," and "How much more will this regulation advance the objective than some other regulation which might interfere less with constitutionally protected interests?" In addition, "How much will freedom … be restricted by this regulation," again considering the probabilities of complete and only partial effectiveness, and "How much more restrictive is this regulation than some other regulation which might achieve the same objective?" 62 Again Karst characterized all these as "questions of fact." Canada), ¶ 70: "First, the measures adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the objective in question. They must not be arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations. In short, they must be rationally connected to the objective. Second, the means, even if rationally connected to the objective in this first sense, should impair 'as little as possible' the right or freedom in question. Third, there must be a proportionality between the effects of the measures which are responsible for limiting the Charter right or freedom, and the objective which has been identified as of 'sufficient importance.'" is a tradeoff between the primary objective and other objectives when considering alternative means, one more intrusive than the other.
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A section explaining that judicial attention to legislative facts would not be inconsistent with a presumption of constitutionality alluded to differences in the trial records in two First Amendment cases, observing that in one "the Court … was faced with a record almost devoid of consideration of the legislative facts, and with briefs of counsel which only partly filled the void." 66 Karst used those differences to introduce a discussion of what could be done to improve the Supreme Court's ability to determine legislative facts.
Legislative facts, according to Karst, involved "prediction and probability," complex matters for which judges "need[] expert help." 67 Brandeis briefs could do something, but trials at which issues of legislative fact were explored were better because trial judges could sort out and evaluate the complexities. Karst devoted several pages to exploring the conditions under which expert testimony and cross-examination were likely to be better than expert memoranda (and counter-memoranda) in putting the trial judge in a position to determine the legislative facts. Then Karst turned to the ability of judges to 65 The point is well-known in the literature on proportionality and of course in parallel contexts such as purposive statutory interpretation. For one particularly clear exposition, 75 Karst alluded to the problem in commenting that it might not be "worth the very considerable extra expense and delay" occasioned by remanding a criminal case for further factual development, but he suggested even so that it "may be appropriate" to "put (noting that "testimony tends to be more costly to the parties").
with "axes to grind," as Karst put it, 76 probably leaving the justices no better informed about the facts than they would have been without the additional information. 79 One expert will say that tires will explode under normal operating conditions at a rate of X blow-outs per mile if they are inflated to Y pounds per square inch, another will say that at Y pounds the blow-out rate will be Z.
Surveys will have to be interpreted, and experts will raise reasonable questions about the effects of the questions' precise phrasing on reported outcomes. Statisticians will question the model specification used to produce epidemiological estimates about some phenomenon important to the factual basis for legislation. 80 We can get reasonably 76 Id at 105.
77 Cf id at 96 (referring to "doubts about the ability of experts to improve on the justices' own efforts"). McCleskey v Kemp, 481 US 279, 312 (1987) ("At most, the Baldus study indicates a discrepancy that appear to correlate with race") (emphasis added). 80 For an amusing list of all-purpose objections to empirical studies, see George Stigler, precise estimates of such facts as the rate at which the moon orbits the earth -certainly good enough to support legislation. But, of course, facts of that sort are almost never legislative facts in Karst's sense. Where more contestable facts are involved, which is to say with respect to almost every statute, an approach to constitutional adjudication that makes choices among such facts important seems misguided.
A more general way of putting this is that legislative "facts" might not really be facts of the sort scientists discover and epistemologists describe. Here the recent trial in California's federal gay-marriage case may be exemplary. The district judge heard extensive testimony and made extensive findings of fact about whether individuals choose their sexual orientation, about whether the availability of same-sex marriage will affect the stability of opposite-sex marriage, and more. 81 There is nothing wrong with calling these facts, but one need not be a post-modernist skeptic to think that they are qualitatively different from facts like the rate at which the moon orbits the earth.
There is, I suggest, a better way of thinking about the legislative facts on which (1982) ("the move to efficiency transposes a conflict between groups in civil society from the level of a dispute about justice and truth to a dispute about facts -about probably unknowable social science data that no one will ever actually try to collect but which provides ample room for fanciful hypotheses."), offers a more tempered version of this suggestion. Kennedy suggests that the inevitable ambiguities in the facts conceded to be relevant leave space for a judge acting in good faith to see as "established" those facts that are compatible with his or her vision of the world, which Kennedy calls "ideology." we would properly not accept the judgment of even as sensible a person as Kalven that a specified "evil" was "too trivial." We would ask whether the legislature's judgment that the evil was worth public regulation was reasonable. And, we would worry about the status of the claim that we can assess a judgment about moral evil -"arousing revulsion"
-with criteria of rationality. We might ask whether it is enough that there be a reasonable basis for thinking that moral evils can be determined through rational analysis and then that there be a reasonable basis, from within that way of thinking, for concluding that "arousing revulsion" is a moral evil. Kalven's assessment that the evil was "too trivial" might reflect his judgment that, from some unspecified perspective, the legislative judgment is unreasonable or irrational, but he was so sensible that he did not see that there might be other perspectives that legislatures were entitled to take. Kalven took the first role, of urbane detachment, with a hint of the second. Yet, I think it reasonably clear that he thought the fourth, that of the "responsible man of affairs," was the one our judges should take. As the final line of his article showed, he believed that the judges' job is different from that of the scholar, who has the freedom to be irresponsible. And, if scholarship has its virtues, so does responsibility. We should admire, Kalven suggested, those who take on important public responsibilities, and not be too harsh in evaluating their work with urbane detachment and irreverent amusement.
Even Kalven's critical comments are generally offered in subdued tones: An argument 96 We talk about the problems in different terms because of the rise of "constitutional theory," but whether the terminology (for example, of decision costs and error costs in connection with the rules/standards or absolutism/balancing discussions) has added anything significant to our knowledge seems to me an open question. 97 Kalven at 45 n 132 (cited in note ---). Government, 78 Harv L Rev 143, 196 (1964) .
constitutional theory as either fools or knaves: fools, because they lacked the intellectual capacity to understand the compelling logic of the arguments supporting the theory, or knaves, because, knowing that the theory was the best one available, they willfully disregarded it in the service of their personal projects. 101 The ideas that the constitutional questions the Supreme Court deals with are genuinely difficult and that the Justices, people of varying intellectual ability, can reasonably disagree over, for example, the strength of the originalist evidence for and against the positions taken by the majority and dissent in District of Columbia v Heller are almost completely absent from today's constitutional discourse -and those who try to advance those ideas are dismissed as naïve (fools) or as pursuing a concealed political agenda (knaves).
The issues Kalven and Karst discussed remain with us, but their sensibility has been lost. It would, I think, be good to retrieve it, but I wonder whether that is possible.
An intellectually ambitious scholar today who is the same age as Kalven and Karst were when they wrote their articles would be well-advised -and I am sure is advised -to avoid doing "mere doctrinal work." 102 Kalven and Karst were engaged with doctrine far more deeply than today's scholars are. 103 For obvious structural reasons those with dual degrees in law and some other discipline are unlikely to, and in my experience do not, achieve the heights that Kalven and Karst reached. 104 But, only by reaching those heights can one truly appreciate the difficulties faced by "responsible men of affairs," and 103 An example is found in the care Kalven took to distinguish between direct regulation of obscenity -penalties imposed on its dissemination -and indirect regulation through rules that induce self-interested actors to "steer wide[] of the forbidden zone," as Justice
Brennan put it in a related context. Speiser v Randall, 357 US 513, 526 (1958) . Drawing on his wide knowledge in the field, Kalven pointed out that lower courts, with seeming approval from the Supreme Court, "steadfastly rejected" the argument that indirect regulation was to be assessed using the doctrines employed to deal with direct regulations. Kalven at 36-37 (cited in note ---).
104 Briefly: Although reasonably smart, well-trained lawyers can do doctrinal analysis to a decent level of sophistication, doing doctrinal analysis at the highest level is difficult indeed, requiring a fair amount of intellectual facility and a wide grasp of doctrine from many fields. Dividing one's intellectual effort between acquiring facility in doctrinal analysis and achieving distinction in another discipline means that one will be unable to reach the heights of doctrinal analysis. And, on the other side, in every "other" discipline of which I am aware, the field "other discipline of law" (legal history, sociology of law, economics of law, and the like) is marginal to the discipline as a whole, which means that the most able graduate students will be drawn to the fields at the discipline's core, leaving the subfield dealing with law populated by perfectly able but not truly exceptional students. (There are of course exceptions, quite rare in my experience.)
